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Canadian governments would be projecting less red ink, and Canadians would
face lower tax burdens, if governments had previously spent only what they
promised at budget time.
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FISCAL POLICYCanadian governments are projecting large amounts of red ink in their 2009
budgets. Notwithstanding the impact of the economic slump on government
finances, it is natural for Canadians to ask whether this new borrowing is partly the
result of insufficient fiscal discipline during the good times, and whether the actual
outcomes will be worse than the projections. 
In the 2009 installment of the C.D. Howe Institute’s fiscal accountability rankings,
we look at how well, or badly, federal, provincial and territorial governments in
Canada have delivered on their spending and revenue budgetary targets over the
past decade. The picture is decidedly mixed. While some governments, such as
Quebec, have tended to come close to their targets, others, such as Alberta and
Saskatchewan, have not, and the overall national picture is one of persistent
spending over-runs, often fuelled by better-than-expected revenues.
In exploring ways in which legislators and voters might better hold governments to
account in the future, this year’s installment also looks at reporting procedures:
whether each jurisdiction’s public accounts clearly present budget-consistent figures,
if they clearly explain deviations, if the relevant auditor has given the accounts a
clean bill of health, and how timely the reporting is. 
Our principal conclusion is that governments would be projecting less red ink, and
Canadians would face lower tax burdens, if governments simply had spent only
what they promised at budget time. Better reporting – and above all, more
determination by legislators and voters to insist that governments deliver on the
commitments voted at budget time – are critical to better fiscal performance in the
future. 
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T
he financial crisis and economic
downturn have changed the
politics of fiscal policy in Canada.
However commendable caution about
deficits may be, and however important
it is to distinguish spending for legitimate
public purposes from old-fashioned
handouts and pork-barrelling, the slump
has at least temporarily knocked down
previous fiscal guideposts. 
For that reason, the spring round of federal and
provincial budgets is a key time for Canadians to
look hard at another touchstone of fiscal policy:
how well governments’ deeds during the year
match their words at budget time.
Especially in unsettled circumstances, the
natural tendency when finance ministers deliver
their budgets in the legislature is to look ahead.
That look forward, however, needs to be informed
by the experience of the past. During fall and
winter before each budget round, governments’
audited accounts for the previous fiscal year are
released. These results – in particular, the contrast
between what the public accounts show and what
each government presented in the budget for that
year – give elected representatives and the people
who vote for them vital context for the next
budget. Are governments that project a deficit
merely victims of circumstance or has their past
overspending played a role? Most important, does
experience provide grounds for believing that a
particular government will deliver on such key
targets as overall revenue, spending, and bottom-
line outcomes, or will success require sharper
scrutiny and harder pressure?
The C.D. Howe Institute’s annual fiscal
accountability rankings hold the answers to these
and related questions.1 The approach in these
measures is straightforward: we compare each fiscal
year’s federal and provincial/territorial budget
projections to the figures recorded in the public
accounts of these jurisdictions after the end of that
year. For both spending and revenue, we measure
bias, or how much governments tend to over- or
undershoot on average, as well as accuracy, or how
close to projections are the results, regardless of the
direction of errors. 
To preview the key findings, Quebec is one of
Canada’s perennially better performers; Alberta
and Saskatchewan, by contrast, tend to struggle.
The national picture is bleak: governments tend to
spend more come year-end than they planned,
which curtails debt reduction and forestalls tax
relief. For every government that has improved its
showing on that score in recent years, moreover,
another has done worse. With total overspending
by all governments in Canada over the past decade
tallying an eye-popping $66.8 billion, there is no
doubt that upcoming deficits are larger than they
would have been if governments had stuck to their
plans.
One obstacle to holding governments to account
can be obscure financial summaries in budgets and
public accounts. For that reason, our rankings this
year also examine reporting procedures in each
jurisdiction. We ask if each government’s public
accounts clearly present figures consistent with the
budget presentation, if the public accounts clearly
explain deviations from budget, and if the relevant
auditor has given the accounts a clean bill of
health. We find considerable room for
improvement in several jurisdictions, and some of
these findings suggest that the apparently good
target-hitting performance of some, including
Quebec, needs closer scrutiny. 
Comparing Past Targets to Actual Results
Our fiscal accountability assessment looks at both
revenues and expenses. Ideally, we would simply
compare levels: dollar amounts projected in budgets
versus dollar amounts recorded in public accounts.
Governments have tended, however, to report
revenues and spending differently in budgets and
public accounts, and some still do – a problem we
take up further in our look at reporting. Changes in
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Announced Spending Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1998/99 0.3 0.4 -2.2 -0.5 -0.5 1.8 -0.6 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.8 -7.4
1999/00 0.1 -1.0 -0.3 4.6 2.1 -1.2 2.9 1.8 -0.3 2.2 1.3 -3.6
2000/01 0.6 3.1 1.5 -0.6 -2.3 2.8 -1.2 -0.6 3.6 1.8 -1.3 4.8 -1.9 3.2
2001/02 5.1 5.4 -0.2 0.5 6.6 3.4 2.2 1.7 5.8 12.5 7.4 4.5 -1.1 1.8
2002/03 3.3 1.5 1.3 0.9 4.4 2.0 3.5 2.2 -0.8 -8.1 -0.3 5.1 -4.4 2.0
2003/04 2.8 5.5 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.3 7.1 4.1 3.4 0.2 -2.4 5.7 -6.8 3.2
2004/05 2.3 0.4 -3.6 4.9 2.3 3.1 6.9 1.1 0.9 2.9 -2.6 2.7 5.1 -6.5
2005/06 1.9 5.5 1.4 4.2 3.2 3.3 4.2 3.5 1.1 5.7 4.7 1.5 5.0 -2.3
2006/07 5.0 10.1 2.6 6.3 1.7 4.1 2.1 3.4 0.1 4.0 3.7 0.8 -3.1 2.6
2007/08 4.6 17.1 8.0 5.1 2.9 4.0 2.6 5.8 1.6 11.7 3.9 4.7 -0.6 2.8
2008/09 2.3 11.1 6.4 2.5 2.7 3.6 0.2 3.3 4.6 9.7 1.1 -1.5 -0.9 4.0
Actual Spending Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1998/99 3.8 -5.3 4.3 3.5 5.5 5.9 2.3 3.6 8.7 4.3 1.1 4.6
1999/00 0.7 -3.4 6.1 6.2 3.8 1.9 7.1 9.4 3.6 10.0 7.8 3.8
2000/01 6.0 6.4 10.7 0.2 -2.3 4.9 -0.5 2.8 2.6 9.5 1.1 6.0 4.1 10.7
2001/02 2.1 5.5 3.8 5.1 7.3 3.2 3.0 1.8 7.0 9.9 10.1 9.2 5.5 8.4
2002/03 4.0 5.9 2.3 1.5 4.2 -0.8 4.1 3.1 0.6 -1.5 1.1 5.7 3.0 5.1
2003/04 3.5 5.1 12.6 6.6 3.9 2.1 7.8 7.1 6.2 5.9 1.1 5.8 9.0 7.1
2004/05 11.5 0.8 0.3 7.9 2.0 4.9 7.4 2.7 3.9 11.1 1.4 5.6 10.7 2.9
2005/06 -0.8 4.9 1.8 6.1 5.9 3.0 5.7 7.2 9.2 11.6 7.2 7.3 1.6 8.2
2006/07 6.2 5.0 3.3 4.6 5.3 4.7 4.9 5.3 7.4 9.1 4.8 4.3 6.7 5.6
2007/08 4.8 11.2 8.2 8.3 7.3 5.2 9.4 8.7 3.9 20.4 7.2 8.4 6.3 3.9
2008/09
Difference (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1998/99 3.4 -5.7 6.5 4.0 5.9 4.2 2.9 2.6 6.7 3.8 0.3 12.0
1999/00 0.6 -2.4 6.4 1.6 1.8 3.1 4.2 7.6 3.9 7.8 6.4 7.5
2000/01 5.3 3.3 9.2 0.8 0.0 2.1 0.7 3.4 -1.1 7.7 2.4 1.2 6.0 7.5
2001/02 -3.1 0.1 4.0 4.6 0.7 -0.2 0.8 0.1 1.2 -2.6 2.7 4.8 6.7 6.6
2002/03 0.7 4.4 1.0 0.6 -0.2 -2.8 0.7 0.9 1.3 6.5 1.4 0.6 7.5 3.1
2003/04 0.7 -0.4 7.9 2.8 -0.4 -2.2 0.7 3.0 2.7 5.7 3.5 0.1 15.8 3.9
2004/05 9.2 0.4 3.9 3.0 -0.3 1.8 0.5 1.6 3.0 8.2 4.0 2.9 5.5 9.4
2005/06 -2.6 -0.6 0.4 2.0 2.7 -0.4 1.5 3.7 8.1 5.9 2.4 5.8 -3.4 10.5
2006/07 1.2 -5.1 0.7 -1.7 3.6 0.6 2.8 2.0 7.2 5.1 1.1 3.5 9.8 3.0
2007/08 0.1 -5.9 0.3 3.2 4.5 1.3 6.8 2.9 2.3 8.7 3.4 3.7 6.9 1.1
2008/09
Table 1. Spending: Annual Projections, Outcomes, and Differences
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors' calculations.
Notes: The 2007/08 public account figures for Nunavut are from Finance Canada's fiscal reference tables because at the time of preparation there were delays
in either tabling the consolidated figures or completing the audit.Backgrounder 117 | 3
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2 Adrian et al. (2007) discuss these problems and the merits of comparing changes at greater length.
accounting between budget presentation and public
accounts reporting can also distort comparisons of
levels. To mitigate these distortions, we compare
changes: the projected year-to-year change in
revenue in the budget to that shown in the public
accounts, and the same comparison of year-to-year
changes in spending.2 We divide the discrepancies
by the budgeted amounts to get percentages that
ease cross-government comparisons.
Table 1 presents annual figures for announced
versus actual spending since fiscal year 1998/99.
The top panel shows the announced spending
changes in budgets, the middle panel shows the
actual spending changes in public accounts, and the
bottom panel shows the differences in percentages.
We summarize the 10-year record in two measures:
￿ Bias – the average of deviations. This is the
simple average, or mean, of the annual results, a
convenient way to assess general tendencies to
under- or overshoot.
￿ Accuracy – the root mean square of deviations.
The mean suppresses potentially important
information: a government could, for example,
exhibit a small 10-year bias because of years of
bad misses in opposite directions, which is not
a satisfactory situation for voters. By showing
the distance of results from projections without
regard to their direction, the accuracy measure
(akin to the familiar statistical standard
deviation) distinguishes governments that miss
targets by very little, in either direction, from
those that miss their targets by a lot.
The bias and accuracy results are presented in Table
2. Quebec scores well ahead of other jurisdictions on
both measures, and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
are also good performers. Prince Edward Island had a
particularity good fiscal year 2007/08, but it remains
low in our 10-year rankings. Newfoundland and
Labrador stands out for a negative bias: on average
over the decade, its government spent less than
planned. That province’s performance stands out all
the more because other jurisdictions with revenues
strongly influenced by natural resource prices tended
to overshoot – among all jurisdictions, only the
Yukon does worse than Alberta.
Change in Expenditure Forecast (%)
Jurisdiction Bias (%) Rank Accuracy (%) Rank Total Overrun ($B)
Federal 1.6 3 3.8 9 20.3
Newfoundland and Labrador -1.2 2 3.6 8 -0.5
Prince Edward Island 4.0 11 5.1 11 0.4
Nova Scotia 2.1 5 2.7 2 1.1
New Brunswick 1.8 4 2.8 3 1.0
Quebec 0.8 1 2.2 1 3.4
Ontario 2.2 6 2.9 4 16.0
Manitoba 2.8 8 3.4 6 2.0
Saskatchewan 3.5 10 4.5 10 2.3
Alberta 5.7 13 6.5 13 12.4
British Columbia 2.8 7 3.2 5 7.4
Northwest Territories1 2.8 9 3.4 7 0.2
Yukon 7.4 14 8.8 14 0.4
Nunavut1 5.6 12 6.5 12 0.4
Table 2. Summary of Spending Bias and Accuracy, 1998/99–2007/08
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, fiscal reference tables (federal department of finance), authors' calculations.
1 Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.| 4 Backgrounder 117
C.D. Howe Institute
Announced Revenue Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1998/99 2.4 1.6 -1.5 -1.3 -0.2 4.3 2.5 0.0 3.6 -11.3 1.1 -3.7
1999/00 0.1 -1.2 -2.9 1.6 1.9 -1.2 6.0 1.8 -0.5 1.6 -0.3 -7.4
2000/01 1.3 3.9 -1.7 0.2 -1.5 2.8 -0.7 1.3 9.8 -1.6 0.5 4.9 1.7 3.1
2001/02 -4.1 5.7 0.6 1.8 4.4 0.5 -1.0 0.6 -11.1 -10.7 2.3 1.6 0.9 5.5
2002/03 0.3 0.7 -0.4 3.1 1.2 2.0 4.9 0.6 2.3 -5.6 -3.6 -13.1 -2.4 -2.5
2003/04 3.4 1.8 4.6 3.8 4.4 4.3 7.8 4.6 -2.8 -2.9 4.1 10.3 1.1 10.4
2004/05 3.4 -3.8 3.1 4.2 4.6 3.1 14.8 4.0 1.8 -9.4 3.2 6.9 2.1 2.7
2005/06 2.3 3.5 3.1 4.4 2.8 3.3 5.9 -0.3 -9.2 -4.9 1.1 1.9 5.0 5.4
2006/07 2.8 0.0 3.1 5.1 0.1 4.4 2.1 3.4 -3.5 -6.3 -0.3 2.0 1.1 2.5
2007/08 1.9 15.8 8.0 5.8 2.8 1.3 2.6 5.8 -6.2 -4.7 -1.7 4.3 -3.3 2.9
2008/09 -1.1 -3.7 6.8 2.3 2.7 0.1 0.4 1.3 -0.3 2.2 -2.3 -4.5 1.0 4.5
Actual Revenue Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1998/99 2.2 -4.1 9.0 3.8 0.6 11.9 6.3 4.0 8.6 -5.5 0.4 13.2
1999/00 6.7 -0.6 5.5 5.1 7.5 1.6 13.0 7.6 4.5 19.8 7.6 -5.6
2000/01 9.0 6.8 4.5 6.4 1.3 7.8 2.8 6.5 15.4 28.0 10.4 22.1 13.7 10.8
2001/02 -3.3 -1.3 4.2 1.0 7.7 -1.4 -1.2 -0.1 -10.2 -14.1 -5.5 10.5 -4.5 -5.2
2002/03 3.8 2.5 -2.8 1.0 -1.3 -1.0 3.7 3.2 6.7 3.5 -3.3 -11.4 6.5 10.3
2003/04 4.7 2.9 5.3 7.2 4.1 2.8 -0.7 4.7 1.6 14.3 8.1 3.0 12.0 6.0
2004/05 7.2 2.1 9.5 9.4 9.4 4.5 13.8 11.5 19.1 13.6 14.2 13.1 12.0 10.1
2005/06 5.2 18.9 5.0 7.0 5.8 3.9 8.3 2.3 5.5 22.0 7.9 11.4 9.4 13.2
2006/07 6.2 -3.2 5.4 5.7 5.2 8.3 7.4 6.1 5.3 7.7 7.1 8.7 5.5 19.0
2007/08 2.8 30.2 5.9 12.2 5.0 4.9 7.5 9.4 14.4 0.0 3.5 8.6 2.1 -8.7
2008/09
Difference (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1998/99 -0.2 -5.7 10.5 5.1 0.8 7.6 3.8 4.1 4.9 5.8 -0.7 16.9
1999/00 6.6 0.6 8.4 3.5 5.6 2.8 7.0 5.9 5.0 18.2 8.0 1.7
2000/01 7.7 2.9 6.2 6.2 2.8 5.0 3.5 5.3 5.6 29.6 9.8 17.2 12.1 7.7
2001/02 0.8 -7.1 3.6 -0.8 3.3 -1.9 -0.2 -0.7 0.8 -3.3 -7.8 8.9 -5.4 -10.7
2002/03 3.4 1.8 -2.4 -2.1 -2.5 -3.0 -1.1 2.6 4.4 9.0 0.3 1.7 8.8 12.9
2003/04 1.3 1.1 0.7 3.4 -0.3 -1.5 -8.5 0.1 4.3 17.2 4.0 -7.4 10.8 -4.4
2004/05 3.9 5.9 6.4 5.2 4.9 1.4 -1.0 7.5 17.3 23.0 11.0 6.3 9.9 7.4
2005/06 2.9 15.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 0.7 2.4 2.6 14.7 26.9 6.8 9.4 4.4 7.8
2006/07 3.4 -3.2 2.3 0.6 5.1 3.9 5.2 2.7 8.8 14.1 7.5 6.7 4.4 16.5
2007/08 0.9 14.4 -2.1 6.4 2.1 3.7 4.9 3.6 20.5 4.6 5.2 4.3 5.4 -11.6
2008/09
Table 3. Revenue: Annual Projections, Outcomes, and Differences
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors' calculations.Backgrounder 117 | 5
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Tables 3 and 4 present analogous measures for
revenues. Scanning the summary measures suggests
that jurisdictions with spending surprises also tend
to have revenue surprises. Do overshoots or
shortfalls of revenue within the fiscal year tend to
drive overshoots or shortfalls of spending? Table 5
looks at these correlations. Quebec, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island, and Alberta all have shown a high
tendency to spend more (or less) than budgeted in
years when revenue came in more (or less) than
budgeted. One cannot say for sure whether a
particular correlation owes more to an actual
unbudgeted spending change or to a target for the
budget balance that induces a government to
manipulate its numbers to offset surprises. What
one can say with confidence, however, is that
spending overshoots by Canadian governments
over the past decade appear to have owed much to
larger-than-expected revenues.   
Trends: Is Accountability Going In or Out of Style? 
It would be nice if the unimpressive overall national
result for the decade had been tempered by an
improvement in more recent years. As the
comparison of the first and second five years in
Table 6 shows, however, there is no consistent
pattern: while many jurisdictions improved, others
got worse. 
Quebec, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island
have improved on both bias and accuracy. A look
back at the annual spending results shows that, if
Prince Edward Island were to extend its recent
record, it would emerge shortly as one of the best to
deliver on its budget promises. Also encouraging is
that the federal government – a notorious budget
breaker in the past – had its most accurate year of
the decade in 2007/08, and would also
substantially improve its standing if it were to
maintain that record. 
Alberta and Saskatchewan have done worse on
both measures, a sign of the special challenges faced
by jurisdictions strongly affected by the resource
cycle. But they are not alone: Ontario’s spending
bias and accuracy both have deteriorated over the
five most recent fiscal years, despite improvements
on the revenue side. Ontario’ record in 2007/08 is
Change in Revenue Forecast (%)
Jurisdiction Bias (%) Rank Accuracy (%) Rank Total Overrun ($B)
Federal 3.1 6 3.9 3 54.3
Newfoundland and Labrador 2.6 4 7.6 9 1.2
Prince Edward Island 3.5 9 5.4 7 0.3
Nova Scotia 3.0 5 4.1 4 1.7
New Brunswick 2.5 3 3.5 1 1.4
Quebec 1.9 2 3.7 2 8.8
Ontario 1.6 1 4.6 6 11.4
Manitoba 3.4 8 4.1 5 2.4
Saskatchewan 8.6 13 10.6 13 6.1
Alberta 14.5 14 17.6 14 34.8
British Columbia 4.4 10 7.0 8 12.9
Northwest Territories1 5.9 11 8.8 10 0.4
Yukon 6.9 12 9.1 11 0.4
Nunavut1 3.2 7 10.5 12 0.2
Table 4. Summary of Revenue Bias and Accuracy, 1998/99–2007/08
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, fiscal reference tables (federal department of finance), authors' calculations.
1 Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.| 6 Backgrounder 117
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Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
Correlation 
of surprises* 0.35 0.01 0.63 0.27 0.13 0.88 0.63 0.42 0.23 0.61 0.37 0.43 0.35 0.21
Rank 7 1 13 5 2 14 12 9 4 11 8 10 6 3
Expenditures
National
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut Average
Bias: 
First 5 years 1.4 -0.1 5.4 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.9 2.9 2.4 4.6 2.6 2.2 7.9 5.7 3.0
Bias: 
Last 5 years 1.7 -2.3 2.6 1.9 2.0 0.2 2.5 2.6 4.7 6.7 2.9 3.2 6.9 5.6 2.9
Difference 0.3 -2.3 -2.8 -0.5 0.4 -1.0 0.6 -0.3 2.3 2.1 0.2 1.0 -1.0 -0.2 -0.1
Accuracy: 
First 5 years 3.2 3.7 6.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.3 3.9 3.6 6.1 3.4 2.9 8.2 6.0 4.1
Accuracy:
Last 5 years 4.3 3.5 4.0 2.6 2.8 1.4 3.4 2.7 5.3 6.9 3.1 3.7 9.3 6.7 4.3
Difference 1.1 -0.2 -2.1 -0.3 0.1 -1.4 1.1 -1.2 1.7 0.8 -0.3 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.1
Revenues
National
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut Average
Bias: 
First 5 years 3.7 -1.5 5.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.6 3.4 4.2 11.9 1.9 9.2 6.8 3.3 3.7
Bias: 
Last 5 years 2.5 6.7 1.8 3.6 2.9 1.6 0.6 3.3 13.1 17.1 6.9 3.9 7.0 3.1 2.5
Difference -1.2 8.2 -3.4 1.3 1.0 -0.5 -2.0 -0.1 9.0 5.3 5.0 -5.4 0.2 -0.2 -1.2
Accuracy: 
First 5 years 4.8 4.3 6.9 4.0 3.4 4.6 3.9 4.1 4.5 16.4 6.7 11.2 10.4 10.6 4.8
Accuracy:
Last 5 years 2.7 9.9 3.3 4.2 3.5 2.6 5.1 4.1 14.4 18.8 7.3 7.0 7.5 10.4 2.7
Difference -2.1 5.5 -3.6 0.1 0.2 -2.0 1.2 -0.1 9.9 2.4 0.6 -4.2 -2.9 -0.2 -2.1
Table 5. Correlation of Surprises, 1998/99–2007/08
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors' calculations.
Note: Given that the measurement period is only 10 years in duration, the statistically significant level of correlation is about 0.55 with a two-tailed 
10 percent significance test.
Table 6. Improvements and Deteriorations in Accountability (%), 1998/99–2002/03 vs. 2003/04–2007/08Backgrounder 117 | 7
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Table 7. An Evaluation of Canadian Governments’ Public Accounts, 2007/08
Notes: Analysis for Nunavut is based on the 2006/07 public accounts. Most regions' public accounts were published within five weeks of audit approval.






Use of Reconciliations Tables and 
Figures, Explanation of Deviations,
Placement in Document
Grade Number of Auditor Reservations over 




Federal Yes, budget figures
match. A
Public Accounts use multiple tables
and figures, supported by text, at the
beginning of document.









No use of reconciliation tables or
explanations, figures do not appear in
main documents.
F 0 (0) - No major reservations. Nov. 18
2008
PEI  Revised estimates appear
in public accounts. D
No use of reconciliation tables or
explanations, results appear early on
in document.




estimates match but appear
later in public accounts.
B
Variance tables given, with explanation of
deviations from budget, but comes later
in document.
A
2 (0) - Last reservation, in 1999/00, was
about a late report from a Crown
Corporation regarding its pension liabilities.
June 30
2008
NB Yes, budget figures
match. A
Multiple variance tables and figures,
supported by text, at the beginning of
document. 





Volume II of Public
Accounts.
D
Multiple variance tables and graphics,
supported by text, but for different
budget figures, at the beginning of
Volume I in the public accounts. 
C
23 (0) - Reservations from 2001/02 to 2005/06
concerned the exclusion of broader public sector
in education and health from results, improper




ON Yes, budget figures
match. A
Multiple variance tables, supported
by text, at the beginning of
document.
A 0 (0) - No major reservations. Aug. 1
2008
MB Yes, budget figures
match. A
Variance tables, some explanation of
deviations from budget, but comes
later in document. 
B
3 (0) - Most recent reservation in 
2006/07 concerned the exclusion of public 




SK Yes, budget figures
match. A
Limited use of reconciliation tables,
detailed explanation for variation, results
appear at beginning of document. 
B
24 (2) - Ongoing objections to recording
transaction with Fiscal Stabilization Fund 




AB Yes, budget figures
match. A No use of reconciliation tables or explana-
tions, results appear early in document.  C 0 (0) - No major reservations. June 18
2008
BC Yes, budget figures
match. A
Variance analysis and reconciliation
tables, limited explanation, results
appear early in document.
B
7 (2) - Auditor cautioned from 1999/00 
to 2003/04 about need to include broader
public sector - schools, universities and
health networks - in results.
June 6
2008
NWT Budget estimates match. A
No use of reconciliation tables or
explanations, results appear early in
document.
C
5 (0) - Clean record since 2000/01, when
interim expenditures were made without
submitting a proper appropriation (without
tabling an associated bill)
Dec. 5
2008
YK Budget figures do not
match. F
Some reconciliation with budget, a
limited explanation of variations, located
early on in document.
D
4 (1) - Most recent reservation highlighted 
a violation of Financial Administration 




Nunavut Budget figures do not
match. F Only previous years’ public accounts
figures are presented. F
9 (2) - The Government of Nunavut has
never tabled its consolidated financial
accounts on time. 2006/07 reservations are
also concerned with the Nunavut Business
Credit Corp.'s improper books of accounts.
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particularly poor, with a sizable positive revenue
surprise more than offset by in-year spending hikes.
Reporting Practices and Fiscal Accountability 
How readily legislators and voters can hold
governments to account for delivering on their
budget promises depends partly on the accessibility
and accuracy of the figures in budgets and public
accounts. So far, we have presented the relevant
figures without commenting on how easy they are
to find and read or questioning their reliability. We
now ask:
￿ Are the aggregate figures for spending and
revenue in public accounts presented on a
consistent basis with those in budgets?
￿ How well do the public accounts explain in-
year deviations from budget targets? 
￿ How clean an audit have the public accounts
received? 
Table 7 summarizes the results. Most jurisdictions
do report their budget figures in the public
accounts; only a handful, however, clearly show and
explain in-year variances. Ottawa – which a few
years ago used different accounting methods for its
budget and public accounts aggregates – now
appears to set the standard, detailing differences
from budgeted amounts in a very clear public
accounts presentation. Newfoundland and
Labrador and the territories do much less well. As
for changes, Manitoba’s 2007/08 public accounts
improved significantly over those in prior years.
In jurisdictions where the budget and public
accounts numbers are consistent and where the
public accounts contain clear reconciliations, we
can take comfort from the fact that a key
accountability tool is available to legislators and
voters – although we might wish them to use it
more vigorously. In jurisdictions where the auditor
has signalled problems with the numbers, however,
we have a major concern – and some grounds for
worrying that the summary figures for bias and
accuracy might rest on weak foundations. Quebec’s
shortcomings both in reporting and with regard to
the auditor’s reservations, for example, cloud its
strong statistical performance. Saskatchewan’s
ongoing audit problems underscore its poor
statistical performance in recent years. 
Concluding Comments
Votes on budget measures in legislatures are votes 
of confidence, and key links in the chain intended
to keep elected representatives accountable for their
use of public funds. Yet this chain breaks if
legislators and citizens allow governments routinely
to break their budget promises. Holding
governments to account is harder if promises and
outcomes cannot be compared easily.
The tendency of Canadian governments to
overshoot spending targets already has had one
important consequence. Canadians might be
prepared to accept deficits as a consequence of the
slump, but recent government budgets would show
less red ink, and Canadians would now face lower
tax burdens, if governments simply had spent only
what they promised at budget time.
With aversion to deficits no longer acting as a
check on spending, moreover, governments might
be quicker to approve spending requests that, on
their merits, deserve a refusal. One way to maintain
fiscal discipline would be to increase the penalty
inflicted by legislators and voters for deviating more
from a promised fiscal course. The more Canadians
hold their governments to account for delivering
realistic budgets and for avoiding in-year changes
that make nonsense of them, the better fiscal
choices are likely to be. Pressure to improve the
quality, accessibility and timeliness of the relevant
information is a key element in that task. 
Canada entered this economic crisis in better
fiscal shape than many other countries. Improved
fiscal accountability can help control spending, tax
levels, and debt in the years ahead, and help ensure
that Canada comes out of the crisis in better fiscal
shape as well.Backgrounder 117 | 9
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